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MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
views on this issue. In effect, the court has taken pains to limit the
operation of the statute by establishing these evidentiary limita-
tions.
FRANK THOMAS CRIVELLO
Insurance Law: Constitutionality of No-Fault in
Massachusetts-For the past several years, everyone involved in
negligence law has had to confront the question of reform in the
traditional automobile accident reparations system. There is wide-
spread agreement that some reform is needed, but at present a great
deal of energy is being expended over whether any of the proposed
"no-fault" systems of auto insurance is a proper means to reform.
First presented in the Columbia Plan,' no-fault was given its
recent impetus by the work of Professors Robert Keeton and Jef-
frey O'Connell,2 who laid a network of criticism at the feet of the
traditional tort-recovery system:
It pays too little, too late, unfairly distributed and at wasteful
cost, and through procedures that promote dishonesty and disre-
spect for the law. These are the symptoms of a fatally ill system.
It cannot survive.3
The general theme of the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection
PI'an is that an injured person is automatically reimbursed for his
economic loss-medical expenses and wage loss-regardless of who
is at fault. In return, the insured surrenders his right to bring a
traditional tort action, and consequently surrenders his right, in
most cases, to recover general damages (pain, suffering, enjoyment
of life, etc.). Variations on this theme have proliferated, differing
in the type of benefits offered, the maximum amounts available,
and the conditions under which tort recovery for general damages
would be allowed.4
I. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT
BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932).'
2. Professors of Law at Harvard University and Illinois University respectively, and
authors of BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
3. Keeton, Basic Protection-An Answer to the Automobile Insurance Crisis, 1 CONN.
L. REV. 13, 16 (1968).
4. At present, some form of no-fault insurance system has been institujed in Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon and South Dakota. These systems are
compared in THE BRIEF, Nov., 1971, published by the Section of Insurance, Negligence and
Compensation Law of the American Bar Association. There is also a comparison of the
basic no-fault proposals in TRIAL, Oct./Nov., 1970, at 8-9.
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RECENT DECISIONS
Massachusetts was the first of the fifty states to adopt a no-
fault system, 5 and so, naturally, was the first state to face a judicial
test to determine whether a system of no-fault compensation vio-
lated any state or applicable federal constitutional provisions. In
Pinnick v. Cleary,6 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
decided that, at least in the limited form presented by Chapters 231
and 670 of the General Laws of that state, and within the facts
presented in the case at hand, no-fault is a reasonable approach to
auto-reparations reform. 7
The Massachusetts Personal Injury Act, which was challenged
in this case, proposes generally to pay one entitled to "personal
injury protection" benefits' his medical costs9 and seventy-five per-
cent of his wage loss 10 up to a maximum of $2000.00.11 The insured
5. Puerto Rico enacted a no-fault plan approximately one year before the enactment of
the Massachusetts plan; however, it was a national insurance program, and prior to it very
few drivers had carried any insurance at all. The province of Saskatchewan in Canada has,
since 1946, had a compulsory no-fault payment plan, but it does not affect the right of the
injured party to sue in tort. See Rafalowicz, The Massachusetts No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Law: An Analysis and Proposed Revision, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 455 n.l (1971).
6. - Mass. _ 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
7. Since this was the first constitutional test of a no-fault plan, the adversaries spareu
no effort presenting their arguments. Petitioner's brief alone ran 373 pages and was joined
by amicus briefs from the American Trial Lawyers Association, the Massachusetts chapter
of the American Trial Lawyers Association, and the Massachusetts Bar Association. Re-
spondent was joined by an amicus brief co-authored by the American Insurance Association
and the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, and by briefs from the Massachusetts Attor-
ney General and the Massachusetts Association of Independent Insurance Agents and
Brokers.
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (1971), defines those entitled to "personal injury
protection" as
the named insured in any such motor vehicle liability policy, the obligor of any motor
vehicle liability bond, members of the insured's or obligor's household, any author-
ized operator or passenger of the insured's or obligor's motor vehicle including a
guest occupant, and any pedestrian struck by the insured's or obligor's motor vehicle
unless any of the above is a person entitled to workmen's compensation benefits.
9. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (1971), defines recoverable medical expenses as
all reasonable expenses incurred within two years from the date of accident for
necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, and dental services, including prosthetic devices
and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services ....
10. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (1971), also provides:
(P)ayments for loss of wages or salary or their equivalent or, in the case of persons
not employed, loss by reason of diminution of earning power, shall be limited to
amounts actually lost by reason of the accident and further limited (1) in the case of
persons entitled to wages or salary or their equivalent under any program for contin-
uation of said wages or salary or their equivalent to an amount that, together with
any payments due under such a program, will provide seventy-five per cent of any
such person's average weekly wage or salary or its equivalent for the year immedi-
ately preceding the accident, or (2) in the case of persons not entitled to wages or
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may sue in all instances for the balance of his medical expenses and
wage loss; 12 however, he may maintain a tort action for general
damages only if he has incurred medical and hospital costs amount-
ing to at least $500.00 or the injury sustained causes death, perma-
nent and serious disfigurement, loss of sight or hearing, loss of a
body member, or a fracture.13
The fact situation in Pinnick placed the claimant squarely
within the new law and so invited the constitutional test. The acci-
dent occurred two days after the bill went into effect, the defendant
was clearly liable under traditional tort rules, and plaintiffs inju-
ries were of the soft-tissue variety, with medical expenses of$ 115.00
and wage loss of $650.00. The trial court dutifully dismissed plain-
tiff's tort suit, and the constitutional test ensued.
Plaintiff initially presented two arguments which would have
created a presumption that the statute was unconstitutional. First,
he argued that the tort action had the status of a vested property
right, and that the statute was unconstitutional in abrogating that
right. However, that battle had been fought and lost in numerous
decisions dealing with legislative abrogation or modification of a
tort action, the courts following the general rule that tort recovery
is not a vested property right until the cause of action has accrued. 4
Plaintiff's second contention was that, to the extent that the statute
eliminated tort recovery, it impaired a "right to personal security
and bodily integrity" which is implicit in the Bill of Rights.' 5
salary or their equivalent under any program for continuation of said wages or salary
or their equivalent to an amount that will provide seventy-five percent of any such
person's average weekly wage or salary or its equivalent for the year immediately
preceding the accident.
11. It should be noted that this $2000.00 maximum applies to medical costs and wage
loss combined. Thus, for example, should a claimant's wage loss alone reach the $2000.00
limit, no recovery for medical expenses could be had on a first-party basis.
12. Whether a suit for the balance of economic loss may include not only amounts above
the $2000.00 limit but also the twenty-five percent not recoverable under first-party coverage
is unclear from a reading of the statute itself. An affirmative answer is suggested in Kenney
and McCarthy, "No-Fault" in Massachusetts, Chapter 670, Acts of 1970-A Synopsis and
Analysis, 55 MAss. L.Q. 23 (1970).
13. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6D (1971).
14. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929) (guest statute); New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917) (workmen's compensation); Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d
47 (1937) (breach of promise).
15. This argument was based on the theory that the Bill of Rights was not meant to be
exclusive-a theory most clearly proposed as the rationale behind the ninth amendment by
Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492
(1965):
The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Constitution's authors that
other fundamental personal rights should not be denied such protection or disparaged
in any other way simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight
constitutional amendments.
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Avoiding direct confrontation with the issue of what rights are
implied in the ninth amendment,16 the Massachusetts court refused
to accept plaintiff's argument that any such right is denied by the
no-fault plan:
Whatever may be the fundamental "right of personal security
and bodily integrity" to which the plaintiff refers, it is not af-
fected by c. 670. That chapter merely limits the common law
right in the automobile accident situation to obtain money dam-
ages on account of unintentionally inflicted pain and suffering
and modifies the procedure for obtaining damages according to
the common law measure for all other elements of recovery.17
With these arguments out of the way, the court was able to
dispose of the case on general due process and equal protection
grounds, the traditional test being whether the statute bears a rea-
sonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. 8 As Chief
Justice Tauro pointed out in his concurring opinion, this made the
plaintiff's task "virtually insuperable.""9
The legislative objectives listed in the decision were the elimina-
tion of court congestion, the high cost of auto insurance in Massa-
chusetts, and the inequities visited upon the plaintiff by the tradi-
tional tort system.20 Those opposed to no-fault have often insisted
that the fatal defect of this approach lies in the fact that, if any-
thing, these three problems may be significantly worsened by no-
fault legislation. 21 But since it is just as arguable that the plan
might significantly operate toward solving these problems, the
presumption of constitutionality was confirmed.
In discussing the test of reasonable substitution for prior rights,
the court relied on a parallel between the no-fault legislation and
workmen's compensation. As in workmen's compensation, while
plaintiffs under no-fault do, to some extent, surrender their rights
to tort recovery, they gain both reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses and limited immunity from tort recovery by any other
16. The ninth amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
17. - Mass. at - 271 N.E.2d at 600.
18. The court also applied the test of whether the statute provided a reasonable substitute
for pre-existing rights, although it is clear from the decision that the court felt this test was
not required. Id. at - 271 N.E.2d at 607.
19. Id. at - 271 N.E.2d at 612.
20. Id. at _ 271 N.E.2d at 602-605.
21. See, e.g., Ghiardi and Kircher, Automobile Insurance: An Analysis of the Massa-
chusetts Plan, 21 SY. L. Rev. 1135 (1970).
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person involved in the accident. As such an exchange was found
adequate in workmen's compensation, 22 so it is adequate here.
Strongly objecting to this analogy, plaintiff insisted that the
Workmen's Compensation Act had, in practical effect, created a
cause of action, since the unholy trio of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk and the fellow-servant rule had almost entirely
blocked a worker's right to recover in tort for an industrial injury.23
However, at least theoretically, adoption of no-fault legislation is
a significantly less drastic modification of a plaintiff's legal right
than was the enactment of workmen's compensation.
The equal protection attacks by the plaintiff were subsidiary,
and the court handled them as such. Plaintiff argued that the condi-
tions for allowing tort recovery were arbitrary and unreasonable
and that the $500.00 limit discriminated against the poor. The
court answered briefly that any demarcation was bound to work
some hardships and inequities, and that plaintiff had not made it
apparent that this system of demarcation was so unreasonable as
to defeat the statute's constitutionality.Y
Pinnick v. Cleary presents some severe problems when one tries
to extend the decision beyond the statement that, as the Massachu-
setts law applies to Mr. Pinnick, a constitutional attack has insuffi-
cient merit to require a reversal. At least four factors stand in the
way of a broader interpretation of the case. First, there are so many
different "no-fault" programs with significant variations that a
finding that one plan is constitutional may have no bearing what-
soever on the plan of another state. In fact, the principal similarity
among all the plans is the feature of first-party payments, and the
objections to that are more philosophical and psychological than
constitutional.
22. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
23. The American Trial Lawyers Association made an extended argument in anticipa-
tion of this parallel. Brief for ATLA as Amicus Curiae at 30-33, Pinnick v. Cleary,
Mass. - 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
24. - Mass. at _ 271 N.E.2d at 610. On December 29, 1971, The Chancery
Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in Grace v. Howlett, 71 CH 4737,
declared the Illinois no-fault plan to be unconstitutional. The Illinois plan differs from that
of Massachusetts in that, first, insurance is not compulsory in Illinois, and, second, recovery
for pain and suffering is allowed up to an amount equal to one-half of the first $500.00 of
reasonable medical expenses, and 100% of such expenses over $500.00. The court's main
argument was that such a bill arbitrarily.discriminated againt the poor, both because they
are statistically most likely not to be covered by auto insurance, and because their medical
expenses are likely to be vastly lower than the medical expenses of people similarly injured
who are in higher economic brackets. The Illinois Supreme Court heard the appeal on
January 8th, 1972. No decision has been announced as of the time of this writing.
[Vol. 55
RECENT DECISIONS
The second factor is the limited nature of the suit involved in
Pinnick. As Chief Justice Tauro's concurring opinion goes to great
lengths to point out, this constitutional test was really one man's
attempted tort suit, with no attempt by either side to present any
facts other than those which gave rise to this particular suit.2 This
means that the issue of constitutionality is not even fully settled in
Massachusetts itself. Suppose, for instance, that another individual
in Massachusetts were to receive a dislocated shoulder in an auto
accident. He is unemployed at the time of the accident, and goes
to a free, or at least very inexpensive county hospital. His medical
bills do not reach $500.00, and he is unable to prove that he would
have obtained employment had he not been injured. What will the
Massachusetts court do with this man's plea that the no-fault plan
has unfairly discriminated against him by eliminating his right to
recover damages for pain, suffering, and loss of earning capacity
simply because of his economic status? One can only speculate as
to the answer.
A third factor, somewhat less tangible, is the unique situation
of Massachusetts with regard to auto-reparations. Massachusetts
was one of the few states to adopt compulsory auto insurance. The
insurance rates in Massachusetts are notoriously high, and recov-
ery is limited by all of the traditional commonlaw barriers to tort
recovery. This has given a "something must be done" aura to the
issue of no-fault in Massachusetts which can be felt in the words
of the decision. Perhaps a state with lower rates, more liberal tort
recovery laws, and less auto-accident litigation would cast a less
lenient glance upon the "rough justice" of such a no-fault plan as
that in Massachusetts.
A fourth factor arises when one asks what effect the decision
will have on the many no-fault bills now being presented in legisla-
tures across the country. The no-fault issue has rapidly become
political, the main result of which is that the decision whether or
not to pass such a bill is coming to rest on opinion polls and
whether or not a given political figure endorses the bill. It can at
least be said that, as the political factor increases in importance,
Pinnick v. Cleary will decrease in relevance.
MICHAEL H. GILLICK
25. By contrast, it is evident from the trial court's opinion in Grace v. Howlett that a
great deal of evidence was presented of a very broad nature, such as the varying costs of
medical expenses in different sections of Chicago. Also, most importantly, the Illinois suit
was a taxpayer's action to enjoin expenditure of public funds on the no-fault plan because
of its alleged unconstitutionality. Thus the plaintiff was in no way restricted as to the
evidence he could adduce on the issue of constitutionality.
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